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Hledam pocitacoveho silence:D LuLzsec.cz

https://twitter.com/…rinsky/posts LuLzCz TORChat: mtu45qf5bcnhi3qb tam budu jecasteji...

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Hakujte planetu!!!
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pro vysechny odvazlivce vojta.skrinsky1 to je skype...DDDDDDDDD








http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LulzSec cti tohle
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Lulz Secu***y, commonly abbreviated as LulzSec, was[1] a black hat computer hacker group that claimed responsibility for several high profile attacks, including the compromise of user accounts from Sony Pictures in 2011. The group also claimed responsibility for taking the CIA website offline.[2] Some secu***y professionals have commented that LulzSec has drawn attention to insecure systems and the dangers of p***word reuse.[3] It has gained attention due to its high profile targets and the sarcastic messages it has posted in the aftermath of its attacks. One of the founders of LulzSec was a computer secu***y specialist who used the online moniker Sabu. The man accused of being Sabu has helped law enforcement track down other members of the organization as part of a plea deal. At least four ***ociates of LulzSec were arrested in March 2012 as part of this investigation. B***ish autho***ies had previously announced the arrests of two teenagers they allege are LulzSec members T-flow and Topiary.

At just after midnight (BST, UT+01) on 26 June 2011, LulzSec released a "50 days of lulz" statement, which they claimed to be their final release, confirming that LulzSec consisted of six members, and that their website is to be shut down.[1] This breaking up of the group was unexpected.[4] The release included accounts and p***words from many different sources. Despite claims of retirement, the group committed another hack against newspapers owned by News Corporation on 18 July, defacing them with false reports regarding the death of Rupert Murdoch. The group helped launch Operation AntiSec, a joint effort involving LulzSec, Anonymous, and other hackers.



podivej se tady


https://twitter.com/…rinsky/posts LuLzCz


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NSA TAJNOSTI HEKNUTE:DDDDDDDDDD serte na nsa a spehujte ji....lulzcz


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The Journal of Technical Health

Vol. XXIII, No.2
SUMMER 1997

P. 6d6
Inside This Issue:
Interviewwiih"Skf"IL....-___---=.....1
Page 1
An Example of
Intelligence Community Synergy
Page 15
SENTINEL:
A Look at Database Secu***y
Page 19
Bodied Fioil..
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ber:l***ifiAd apG! Approyed for ReIAElsP-b ...... NSA on -] n 1 -J 201 ~/ pursuant to E C") 13526 MOR (_Else #. ~-477a

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CRYPTOLOG


Summer 1997
Vol. XXIII, No.2

Published by P02, Operations Directorate Intelligence Staff

Publisher ..................................................................... William Nolte (963-5283)


Editor ......................................................................... 1 (963-5283)


Board of Advisors -./ P. L. 86-36

" .,«,

Chairman ................................................... j 1----(963-7712)
Computer Systems ...................................... ,....______--.,--(?61;.1051)
Cryptanalysis............................................. .(Q63~7243)
Intelligence Analysis ................................... William Nolte, P02 _-(963-5283)
Language ................................................... \ ~------/(963-7667)
Mathematics............................................... f -_ _(963-1363)
Signals Colle.cti~n ..................................... : /1 (963-5717)
Telecommumcatlons .................................. 1 (996-7847)
Member at Large....................................... 1 -(968-4010)
Member at Large....................................... r (961-8214)


Contents of CRYPTOLOG may not be reproduced or disseminated
outside the National Secu***y Agency without the permission of the
Publisher. Inquiries regarding reproduction and dissemination should be
directed to the Editor.

All opinions expressed in CRYPTOLOG are those of the authors. They
do not represent the official views of the National Secu***y Agency/Central
Secu***y Service.

To submit articles and letters, please see last page.

FOR OFFICIA.L USB ONL¥



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Table of Contents

Interview with "Ski" 1....___----'kU),by Bill Nolte ...................................................1


Signals Analysis:
The Untold Success Story (U), b~L...-____----II"HH•.... ~~ ..•.~ .•.........; •••.••.. ~.1_0


Adventure in the Attic: .·/P. L. 86-36
An Example ofIe Synergy (U), b}jr---------------,t.:'::::iS/

SENTINEL: A Look at Database Secu***y (U), byl ~ .............................d9


.IL-______________----Ilbyr-"I---...,~...............22


Book Review:
Rapid Development: Taming Wild Software Schedules (U) ...........................32


EO 1.4. (c)

P.L. 86-36
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CRYPTOLOG
Summer 1997

Perspective:

Lessons Learned

P.L. 86-36
Interview withlL...-_________----'

One ofthe pioneers ofsignals analysis reflects on a fifty-year career in cryptologic service

(V) An important theme in Twentieth Century Cryptology is its expansion beyond the cl***ic
"code making and code breaking" endeavors that stretch back as long, or so it seems, as humankind
has been attempting to communicate.
(V) The development of traffic analysis remains one of the most significant of those expansions.
The analytic effort to derive useful information from the externals of message traffic, in
addition to or apart from success in reaching the underlying plaintext of the message contents,
ranks as a defining event in cryptologic history Beyond its intelligence value, traffic analysis
pointed to something fundamental about the cryptology of our time: the fundamental importance
of understanding not just the content of communications and the means to hide those contents but
of the systems and technologies that carried those communications.
(V) An obvious point? In retrospect, possibly. But the history of cryptology and of the agencies
that practice it are largely told in the gap between the retrospective obvioqs and earlier conventional
wisdoms. After the Second World War, signals analysis represented yet another
potential extension of cryptologic activity. But was it truly cryptologic in nature? Or was it more
simply a matter of communications research, with, it might be granted, some intelligence implications.
P.L. 86-36
(vj kanyril.lIllberof NSA personnel might hesitate for a second on
the full name before reaching recognition with "Dh, you mean 'Ski."') has spent a career, a halfcentury
at the center of the evolution of signals analysis. In December 1996, shortly before his
retirement, Ski discussed his career with Cryptolog.

(V) Let's st**t chronologically. You went (V) No. The draft was still on, but the Navy
into the Navy in 1946, when you were 18 years had a program-I guess all the services had someold.


thing like this-called the Kiddy Cruise. If you
enlisted in the Navy at 17 and stayed until you

(V) I was still 17. were 21, you got credit for four years of service
plus all your GI Bill benefits for schooling, hous(
U) Were you drafted? ing, and all those other things. So I enlisted in
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CRYFTOLOG

Summer 1997

August, I was 18 in October, stayed for three years
and two months or whatever it was; I would have
received credit for four years of federal service had
I stayed in.

(U) How did you get into cryptologic service?
Was that just a decision by the guy at the
recruit depot?
(V) No. It happened somewhere between the
time I enlisted and the time I got out of boot camp.
I was one of fifteen selected to be sent from Great
Lakes, Illinois, to Washington, D.C., for this
strange training that nobody knew anything about.
George Rocawich was another in that group. He
became one of our premier traffic analysts and just
retired a few years ago. There was another group
that came from the San Diego recruiting center,
and they lorded it over the rest of us that they had
come by ship to the East Coast. We had come by
train from Chicago, so they had sea duty, and we
didn't.
(V) We arrived in D.C., reported to the Navy
Department, and they said we were to take off for a
few days and then to report to Nebraska Avenue,
the Naval Secu***y Station or U.S. Navy Communications
Station Washington (CSAW) as it was
known then.
(V) What did you do after reporting there?
(V) The first thing, while we waited for our
clearances, we were ***igned in an LIC area in the
attic studying electricity, math, typing, and cryptography.
Our CO was CDR John Quincy Adams
III, a direct descendant of President Adams.
(U) Jim Bates was part of that group and we
always went to him with our crypt problems
because he always had the solution first. From
there, my first ***ignment after being cleared was
in the personnel office. Then I was ***igned to
R&D, and I was a yeoman for a while and then
communications technician or CT. From there I
was re***igned to what became the R&D signals
analysis lab. It wasn't called that then, but that's
basically what it was. The Navy organization was
N33 (later to become AFSA 334).
(V) In fact, though, the basic mission of the
lab was for support to engineers building equipment;
the use of signals analytic results for intelligence
production was really a secondary mission.
But we did have different kinds of signals coming
in and the types of questions that were being
asked-what kind of signals were they? How did
they look? What did we have to cope with them?
Who was the user? I took a real interest in that, so
in addition to doing the administrative duties for
the office, I also began working on the signals and
found that more interesting.
(V) We've been in a period of downsizing
tbe last few years. But tbat period immediately
after the war must bave been a tremendously
difficult period.
(V) When I transferred from the Navy to civilian
life in 1949, it was only through intervention of
the folks inside the building that I got on board.
They were not hiring--certainly not clerks. I
wasn't exactly in a c***ical skill.
(V) But the fact that I had learned something
about signals analysis and was interested in pursuing
that made the difference. The chief of the
research element needed someone who fit my qualifications,
and he hired me. The Lord was smiling
at me all the way on that one. •
(V) You were bired as a clerk?
(V) Yes. "Clerk, General" is what they called
it at the time.
(V) At what grade?
(V) Then it was called CAF-4, at about $2700
per year. Which was only slightly more than I was
making in the Navy.
(U) Were you at Nebraska Avenue when
AFSA was formed?
(U) Yes. They called us all together, the whole
complex, to the back of the loading dock of what I
think was Building 4A, while they announced that
we were now the Armed Forces Secu***y Agency.
It didn't mean a whole lot, and of course the ser'
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vices weren't too keen on the idea.

(V) How much did things change after
that? Did the Army people st**t to show up at
Nebraska Avenue and so on?
(D) Oh yes. There was a big exchange of people.
I left Nebraska Avenue and went over to
Arlington Hall. Because of the new structure new
opportunities were available. That's where we
st**ted signals analysis in the production organization.
The first organization was AFSA 204. The
research folks were, as I said, more interested in
the subject from the point of view of building
equipment. The production element was very
small: an Army captain named Ron Schmidt,
myself, and two maintenance technicians. And
me.
(D) But that was the st**t of what became
NSA W34, T16, and AS? The latter two were
evolved from the processing efforts whereas W34
stayed with signals analysis.
(U) When you look at that fact on your
resume "st**ted the first signals analysis effort
in the production organization," that's a rather
striking statement. It's hard to realize there
was ever a point where we didn't have a signals
analysis effort.
(D) Well, there was the effort in RID, but not
in operations.
(U) Was that controversial? Were there
people who fought that?
(8 em) Signals analysis was not well understood
at that time. At first there was no duplication
of effort since our mission was so totally different
from that of RID. It did cause some problems later
until the two efforts were joined in 1972. To
answer your question directly, it wasn't something
we set out to do with some elaborate plan. In fact,


I I


(V) When I was in R&D we were using wire
recorders, and it almost forced you to take up
smoking. The only way to splice the wire was to
CRYPTOLOG

Summer 1997

tie the two ends of the wire-which was always
breaking-in a square knot, pull it tight, and fuse it
with some kind of heat. Well with one hand on
each end of the wire, there was no way to hold a
soldering iron or a match, so we soon learned how
to touch the wire with the end of a lighted cigarette.

'--___________----' Every job I
had, and every time I either got promoted/or we
reorganized, my job was described as either an
engineering aide or communications specialist or
something. It wasn't until about 1954 that we
came up with signals analyst to describe what we
did. EO 1. 4. (c)

P.L. 86-36
(S eeO) In 1958 we became a division.
Admiral Tommy R. Kurtz, USN, was.the Director
for Production (PROD) when we st**ted to work

..............


........


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CRYPTOLOG
Summer 1997

(U) Ldidn't realize this at the time, because
when you're a GS-12 working in the basement you
don't geUoo involved in the politics of anything.
But the Navy was very jealous, but Adm. Kurtz
was convinced this was a SIGINT challenge and
NSA was going to handle it. and we did.
(U) Did you ever think you were going to be
transferred back to the Navy or something like
that? .
(U) Not really. Of course, AFSA had its problems.
But then we became NSA and things seemed
to settle down a little. But we still had-beyond
my pay grade and my interest-politics of one sort
or another. At my level, we had work to do, and
signals to analyze, so we didn't get involved in it.
.
P.L. 86-36

(5 CGO) And we were able tqget things done.

I:
I:
With NSA's help, the Navy was able to build the
IThat was built and in place
lD about a year. It was one of the fastest projects
. I've ever seen.
I'm almost positive that Charlie
Gandy in RID built the recognizer that went to the
field to recognized this specific signal. The real
secret part of the whole project wasn't that we
could intercept the signal so much as it was the
ability to OF it. And that was built into the system.

(U) You mentioned politics. What about the
politics within the building. Were the signals
analysts accepted as part of the process?
(g-CCO) No. In fact, what was then GENS 2 Iwas not too keen that we were workin~ on tb~'1

. and .we
weren't part of GENS. So we were more or less
tolerated. It helped tremendously that we had
Admiral Kurtz as chief of PROD suppt'>rting us.
Not that he ignored GENS 2, but he paid a lot of
attention to us. He'd come down .into the basement,
take off the jacket with all those ribbons on it
and hang it on a chair, and say, .'~What do you have
today, Ski?" He was a strong. believer in teamwork
and saw to it that it worked Jar us.


(D) We had a terrific team. There was about
five of us. Vernon Ftanks was in the Navy. Bruce
Russell was a civilian analyst. Another who made
EO 1.4. (c)

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chief later on was cn James Killeron, USN.
Leroy Spiess was our contact in GENS. But what a
team!

(U) I received the largest Special Act Award
the agency had ever given to that time. Admiral
Kurtz came down one day and told me he'd put me
in for an award, and I told him I was going to have
to buy him a coffee. "Coffee, hell," was his
response. "You're going to have to buy me a car."
That was a lot of money in 1960. But that wasn't
the point. It was such a hard project, and so many
people worked so hard on it. Not just at NSA, but
the Navy, and the other services. It was a terrific
effort. ADM Kurtz signed my picture of the presentation
with 'team work with competence can't··
be beat.' That is still so true to this day.
(D) Beyond cryptanalysis, beyond traffic
analysis, the development of signals analysis
could be thought of as almost another concentric
circle of cryptology, couldn't it.
(D) One thing that was/different was that we
didn't always p*** things on from one stage of the
process to another the way we do now. I had my
job, which was signals analysis,and there was a
sense that I didn't need/to knowwhether the cryptanalysts
were reading the system or not. We were
much more inclined to say to the engineers, "Here
are the parameters on which you need to work.
Don't ask about anything beyond that." And we
did the same with every other stage of the process.
It was fairly segmented.
(D) Talk/about that. Weare doing things
differently,and there are very clear tradeoff's
involved intbat.
CRYPTOLOG

Summer 1997

(D) I think the way we're going now is a little
better. I really do. I don't think everyone in the
chain needs to know everything, but there were
things we didn't know in the signals arena that
folks watching the traffic did know. As it turned
out, sometimes we found out things by accident
that we had to know, such as the length of standard
messages. We had to know that, and we have to be
able to share information.
(D) It really helped to know schedules and
things of that sort, so we would know where to
look. We didn't have to know every detail.
(U) Let's talk for a moment about career
issues. Were you one of the early group to come
out to NSA?
(D) Not the first group, but early on. Some
things haven't changed. We reorganized a lot, and
people moved back and forth between Nebraska
Avenue and Arlington Hall, and then we got
ordered out here. It never failed. Every time I
moved my residence to get closer to work, I got
re***igned.
(D) What was it like working for NSA in the
1950s?
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CRYPTOLOG

Summer 1997

(U) It was just the best place to be. I guess
that's what kept me here for fifty years.
(U) But you get the sense-greater secrecy
and all-that this was a much tighter community
of people.
(U) I was talking about this just the other day.
You kept such a close hold on what your did and
where you worked. You took your badge off when
you cleared the gate. You told people you worked
for the government or the Defense Department. If
anyone asked what you did, you said you were an
analyst, or an engineer, or whatever. A good example
is that my Navy records do not reflect my
***ignment to CSAW, but merely to Navy Barracks
Washington D.C.
(U) When I first saw the tenus signals analysis
and COMINT in the newspaper I nearly had a heart
attack. ELINT was one thing, because the services
had their own ELINT operations, and so on. But
COMINT! That was enough to send shivers up my
spine.
(U) You really had an extraordinary group
of folks at the top of the place, didn't you?
(5 eeO) The nice part of my job was it took
me through all the different components of NSA.
Dr. Tordella was actually the Chief of C at the time

I

(5 eeO) Dr. Tordella had that ability to see the
whole SIGINT process. And he was such a human
person. I was standing out in front of the building
one day when Dr. Tordella was escorting a senior

DOD official out to his car. They walked past me,
stopped, and turned around. Now, it was around

5:00 in the afternoon, so I didn't think I was leaving
early. And even if I had, I didn.'t think Dr.
Tordella would chew me out in front of a visitor.
But he came over and told the visitor that I was the
gentleman responsible for all the requests NSA
was putting on the department of research and
development as a result of all the new signals we
were finding, I I I was
glad that was over, because I didn't know what he
was going to do.
(U) His heart was really in the technical end of
the business. He'd come down to the basement,
look around, and ask questions. From time to time,
he'd stick his head behind the racks to see how
everything was wired up. And he didn't like to see
wires just tossed around carelessly back there. He
wanted them neat and laced together. He was one
of the finest people this agency ever produced. Of
course there are many others, but I think of him as
certainly one of the best.
(U) Like a lot of the people from that era,
you had come in from the service, without a college
degree and then ended up going to school at
night.
(U) That was very common in those days.
And you'd go down to someplace like George
Washington, and you'd find Dr. Tordella and people
like that teaching a course and a number of
your fellow workers in cl*** with you.
(U) Working full time, going to school, sometimes
holding a second job. It was tough. But
those were good times, and I wouldn't trade them
for anything.
(U) You stayed in the signals analysis effort
for a long time and then went off to field operations.
What was that all about?
(U) I went to the Air War College, graduating
in 1968, and they wouldn't let me have myoId job
back. At tbe time, that was probably one of the
bigger disappointments of my career. So I went to
work in field operations. At that time, anything
that involved feedback to the sites, making sure
EO 1.4. (c)

P.L. 86-36 TOP S~C~Tmuuu·...
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they were properly equipped and informed went
through there. We were basically responsible for
seeing that they had what they needed to do their
jobs.

(V) One of the problems we had was that all
the group chiefs at that time, people like Art Levenson
and Frank Raven, were going in to Gen.
John Morrison, the 000, and trying to get top prio***y
for processing. So the folks in the processing
area got a little tired of three and four people asking
for some sort of change in prio***ies, all based
on the idea they should have first shot.
(U) So, General Morrison decided he was tired
of hearing all of this and decided we needed a plan.
So, the Signals Processing Requirements Panel
was born, in order to sort out some of this. It was
staff work, pure and simple, which I wasn't too
keen on, but it had to be done. I only spent a couple
or three years there.
(U) Followed by a tour in the office of
ELINT?
(U) So you've been a manager but always
with signals analysis roots. How do you feel
about the relationship between technical skills
and managerial skills?
(U) From a personal standpoint, I had the best
of both worlds. I knew enough from the technical
side to hold my own in signals analysis and collection.
I was not an engineer nor a mathematician, so
if I tried to go back to signals analysis these days I
wouldn't stand a chance. Somehow, along the way,
I'd acquired enough managerial ability-I think I
CRYPTOLOG
Summer 1997

was good with people and good at pulling teams
together. I don't know really how it happened. I
went from being a section chief to a branch chief,
to division and ended up being the deputy of W3.
But because of my early background I was viewed
by some folks as technical; others saw me as managerial.
To this day, I still don't know how the decision
was made to make me an SLE but I am
certainly glad it was done!

(V) The fact is that in those days you didn't
get ahead unless you were a manager. If I hadn't
become a branch chief and a division chief, who
knows where I would have ended up.
(U) And that's a continuing issue.
(V) I think at least through branch management,
you have to have technical roots in this business.
You have to have some sense of what your
people are doing. You have to be able to mentor
them and help them solve their technical problems.
(U) We're going to have to leave some
details of your career to the oral history program.
You've spent so long as Technical Director
of B Group, I want to spend some time on
that. How did you wind up there?
.

(V) I had spent seven years as Deputy of W3,
the Office of Search. It was time for me to move. I
was transferred and at the request ofI I
was ***igned to R5 to do a study of the signals
analysis effort and to work on development of .a
system for moving technology out of the R labs
into the operational areas. The signals analysis
work force was aging and there were no people in
the pipeline. / .ip . L. 86-3 6
(U) I was disappointedjnleavingW3, and I
was fanning ;0 (akOR5 my swa. song. $Ul
when announced he \:'Vas going to private
industry, was determine